NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING BAN YIELDS

TO CONSUMER RIGHT TO KNOW: COMMERCIAL SPEECH GRANTED
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION-Virginia

State Board of Phar-

macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817
(1976).
The Commonwealth of Virginia ascribed unprofessional conduct
to the pharmacist who published or advertised the price of prescription drugs. 1 The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, a "regulatory
body" and "licensing authority," was charged with enforcement of the
advertising ban.2 A significant variance in the price of prescription
drugs throughout the state 3 led the Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council to bring suit against the board seeking both declaratory relief
and an injunction to restrain enforcement of the statute. 4 Joining the
council in this suit were Lynn Jordan, as an individual consumer, and
the state AFL-CIO, whose membership included users of prescription drugs. In seeking to invalidate the statute, these consumers al'

Section 54-524.35 of the Virginia Code provides in pertinent part:
Any pharmacist shall he considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who
(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner
whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms
for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs
which may be dispensed only by prescription.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35(3) (Mlichie 1974).
2 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S.
Ct. 1817, 1820 (1976). The board is statutorily authorized to "[m]aint[ain] ... the ...
efficacy of drugs . . . dispensed" and "the integrity of, and public confidence in, the
profession." VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.16(a), (d) (Michie 1974). In order to carry out its
responsibilities, the board is empowered to promulgate rules and regulations for the
maintenance of professional standards. See id. § 54-524.17 (Supp. 1976). Pharmacists
found guilty of unprofessional conduct could be subjected to license revocation, suspension, or fines. See id. § 54-524.22:1 (1974).
3 Indicative of the wide range of price differentials for the same drug in Virginia
were the following statistics submitted by the parties: in northern Virginia, Darvon
prices reflected a 55% variance; in Richmond, Achromycin prices reflected a 140% differential; in the Newport News-Hampton area, Tetracycline prices showed a price differential of 650%. Appendix at 14, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Appendix].
4 Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp.
683, 684 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
' The Virginia State AFL-CIO asserted that many of its 69,000 members were users
of prescription drugs. Lynn Jordan was a chronic sufferer of diseases for which she was
required to use prescription drugs regularly. Appendix, supra note 3, at 9.
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leged that the prohibition on drug-price advertising violated their
first amendment right to receive such information. 6
Since the constitutionality of a statute was at issue, a three-judge
district court was convened. 7 The court declared the advertising ban
embodied in section 54-524.35(3) of the Virginia Code 8 to be violative
of the consumer's first amendment right to know. 9 In reaching this
conclusion, the court distinguished an earlier district court ruling 10
which had upheld the statute against a fourteenth amendment due
process attack brought by pharmacists. 11 Finding the present case dif6 Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp.

683, 684 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
7 See Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F.
Snpp. 683, 684 & n.4 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). The court was convened
pursuant to the Three-Judge Court Act § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed 1976),
which read in pertinent part:
An interlocutor,. or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute . . . shall not be granted by any district
court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court
of three judges ....
When Congress repealed this section, it noted that the original purpose behind the
adoption of the three-judge requirement had been to protect state legislation "from
hasty, ill-considered invalidations." S. REP. No. 204, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3153, 3161. However, the reasons for the
promulgation of the original three-judge statutory requirement were considered no
longer valid, especially in light of the significant countervailing arguments presented for
its repeal. The arguments proffered consisted of the following: (1) the need to relieve
the substantial case load of three-judge courts; (2) the need to eliminate existing uncertainties concerning procedures in three-judge courts; (3) the determination that the original purpose behind the enactment of the three-judge requirement had already been
statutorily eliminated; and (4) a finding that safeguards in the area of federal injunctive
action had been created through case law. S. REP. No. 204, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3162-63. Based upon these arguments, Congress repealed two sections of this Act on August 12, 1976. Act of Aug. 12,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1-2, 90 Stat. 1119.
8 VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35(3) (Michie 1974), quoted at note 1 supra.
9 Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp.
683, 687 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
10 Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969), discussed at
note 11 infra.
11 Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 823 (W.D. Va. 1969); see Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683,
685-86 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). In Patterson, the constitutionality of
the Virginia advertising ban on prescription drug prices had been upheld. 305 F. Supp.
at 823. The suit was brought by a discount drug chain and an individual pharmacist, both
alleging, in part, that the ban was violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. After
having publicized discounts on prescription drugs, the plaintiffs were threatened with
license revocation by the state board of pharmacy. Id. The court found that since "prescription drugs [were] so intimately related to the public health," the statute was a valid
exercise of Virginia's police power and was not in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 826.
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ferent in that the consumer's right to know was "fundamentally
deeper than a trade consideration," the court granted the requested
injunction.12 Thereafter, the board of pharmacy appealed and the
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. 1"
In Virginia State Board of Phamnacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-

Council, Inc., 1 4 the Supreme Court, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting, 15 affirmed the district court's opinion and held that
the advertising of prescription drug prices was not "wholly outside
the protection of the First Amendment. '"16 Furthermore, the Court
found that the protection of the first amendment extended to consumers as receivers of the information. 17 Although the Court
cautioned that its decision was one limited to the profession of pharmacy, it established a "content" test for determining whether various
other types of advertising would be accorded first amendment
protection. 8 Despite the fact that the purview of the first amendment was extended into the commercial area, the Court clearly indicated that the state still retained the power to regulate advertising in
order to "insur[e] that the stream of commercial information flows
cleanly as well as freely. ' 19
The question before the Court in Virginia Citizens was whether
commercial speech-communication which was devoid of "any
cultural, philosophical, or political" conmmentary and which had as its
sumer

l2 Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp.
683, 686-87 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). The court emphasized the
fact that this ),as a suit brought hy consumers seeking access to information "not otherwise fairly available.- 373 F. Supp. at 685 (emphasis in original). This situation, plus
the added factor that many of the consumers heavily relied upon prescription drugs for
maintaining their health, led the court to distinguish the Patterson case from the one at
bar. Id. at 685-86. For further discussion and analysis of the district court's opinion, see
Note, Professional Price Advertising Set Free?--Consumers' "Right-To-Know" in Prescription Drug Price Advertising, 8 CONN. L. REV. 108 (1975); Comment, The Right to
Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations,63

CEO. L.J. 775, 793-94 (1975); 23 KAN. L. REV. 289 (1975). See also 37 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 617, 619 (1971).
13 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 420
U.S. 971 (1975).
14 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
15 Id. at 1835. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 1819. Chief Jus-

tice Burger and Justice Stewart each filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 1831-32.
Justice
Stevens did not take part in the decision. Id. at 1831.
16 d. at 1825-31.
17Id. at 1822-23.

18See id. at 1825-26, 1831 n. 2 5. For a brief summary of the content test, see text
accompanying notes 32-34 infra.
19 96 S. Ct. at 1830-31. The Court noted that Virginia still retained the power to
regulate advertising by means other than the total prohibition of price publication. Id.
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primary purpose economic gain-was entitled to first amendment
protection. 20 Commercial speech had long been considered outside
the scope of the first amendment because it did not represent communication necessary to political decisionmaking. 21 The primary purpose of the first amendment was to "protec[t] the freedom . . . of

thought and communication by which we 'govern.' "22 Commercial
speech was not communication of this order and therefore was not a
23
proper subject for first amendment protection.
The Court's acceptance of this traditional view was evident in
Valentiue v. Clrestensen 24 where the issue of extending such protec-

tion to commercial speech was initially raised. The Court held that
"purely commercial advertising" could be effectively restrained by a
state, thus marking the beginning of a judicially-recognized commercial speech exception. 25 In a brief opinion, the Valentine Court con20

1d. at 1825. The Court indicated that, for the pharmacist, commercial speech consisted of a communication which encompassed no more than the proposition that " 'I
will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.' " Id.
21 The principle that the first amendment was adopted to insure the continued vitality of a democratic form of government and was, therefore, limited to commentary
within that scope, had been formulated by Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245; see Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 434 (1971). For a general discussion of Dr. Meiklejohn's
views, see Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965); Redish, supra at 434-38.
22 Meiklejohn, supra note 21, at 255.
23See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). Various commentators
questioned the Court's adoption of the restrictive Meiklejohn interpretation which excluded commercial speech from protection. Pointing to the increasing importance of an
educated consumer, these writers argued that the achievement of an economically satisfxing life was as important as a politically independent one. As a result, they concluded
that commercial speech should be entitled to constitutional protection. See, e.g., Goss,
The First Amendment's Weakest Link: Government Regulation of Controversial
Advertising, 20 N.Y.L.F. 617, 632 (1975); Redish, supra note 21, at 434-38; Comment,
supra note 12, at 800-02.
24 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
25 Id. at 54. The statement in Valentine, excluding commercial speech from first
amendment protection, was rather cursory and was not supported by reference to any
authority: "[T]he Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising." Id.
Justice Stewart, concurring in Virginia Citizens, characterized Valentine as creating
an "anomolous [sic] situation," 96 S. Ct. at 1833, and indicated that it did not follow the
line of reasoning previously adopted by the Court. See id. at 1832. He cited Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940), for the establishment of a broad principle that freedom of speech encompassed all information of societal interest or importance. 96 S. Ct.
at 1832. Justice Stewart further explained that the Thornhill decision was followed by
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), which created a narrow exception
to first amendment protection for communication that "inflict[s] injury or tend[s] to
incite an immediate breach of the peace," 315 U.S. at 571-73. See 96 S.Ct. at 1832. He
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cluded that New York City could enjoin Chrestensen from distributing
leaflets which advertised a tour of a submarine. 26 Chrestensen had
been informed by the city police commissioner that only flyers of public interest or protest could be lawfully distributed in the streets. 2 7 In
an attempt to evade the ordinance prohibiting purely commercial distribution, Chrestensen had affixed to the back of his advertisement a
28
protest regarding the city's refusal to grant him wharfage facilities.
In upholding the validity of the statute, the Court appears to have been
more concerned with Chrestensen's attempted subterfuge than with
the mere interpretation of the ordinance. 29
The conclusion of the Valentine Court, that commercial speech
was not entitled to constitutional protection under the first amendment, was consonant with a prior decision which had found a profes30
sional advertising ban not violative of the fourteenth amendment.
then referred to Valentine as the next case in this series involving a first amendment
issue and noted that it was decided without reference to Chaplinsky. Id. This omission,
Justice Stewart implied, supported the Court's decision to finally abandon Valentine
and the principle that it established in so cursory a manner. Id. at 1833.
Various authors have remarked on the lack of precedent for the Valentine holding.
See, e.g., Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The First Amiendoient at a Discount,
41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 60, 64-67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The First Aoiendnent at a
Discount]; Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DE PAUL
L. REV. 1258, 1263-65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as An End in Sight to Chrestensen?].
26 316 U.S. at 52-53, 55.
27 Id. at 53. The New York City ordinance prohibited the distribution of any commercial matter on the city streets. See id.
28 Id.

29 See id. at 55. The Court reasoned that Chrestensen merely added the public protest to his flyer so he could lawfully distribute his advertisement in the streets. Id. The
Court indicated that if Chrestensen's action proved successful in evading the prohibition of the statute, other merchants would quickly follow suit. Id.
30 Compare id. at 54-55 with Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners,
294 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1935). In Seriler, plaintiff was seeking to have declared unconstitutional, as violative of the fourteenth amendment, an Oregon statute prohibiting advertising by dentists. Id. at 608-09. The Court found that the state had the power both to
regulate professions and to protect the public health and that, therefore, the statute
represented a reasonable exercise of such police powers. Id. at 611-12. The conclusion
of the Senler Court was later followed in Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in
Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 425-26, 428 (1963), and in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 487-90 (1955).
Several state courts, however, have invalidated statutes prohibiting advertising by
pharmacists in suits brought on fourteenth amendment grounds. See, e.g., Stadnik v.
Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sax-ALot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 121, 311 A.2d 242, 252 (1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 199, 272 A.2d 487, 495 (1971). These state courts had obviouslv not felt constrained to follow the Supreme Court rulings; the Pennsylvania
supreme court indicated that this was due to the fact that state and federal constitutional
law had taken divergent paths. 441 Pa. at 190, 272 A.2d at 490. The respective courts
concluded that the statutory advertising bans bore neither a reasonable nor a substantial
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However, the Valentine ruling failed to establish a clear first amend-

ment standard regarding speech in a commercial context. 31
In subsequent decisions, the Court narrowed Valentine's broad
exclusionary holding by adopting a content analysis and balancing
approach. 32 In order to determine if the commercial speech in question were entitled to first amendment protection, the content of the
advertisement would be examined and then the state's interest would
be contrasted with that of the individual. 33 If the content could be
relationship to the ends sought to be achieved by the legislatures, such as maintaining
professional standards or protecting public health. As a result, the statutes could not be
sustained. 140 So. 2d at 874-75; 270 Md. at 119-23, 311 A.2d at 251-52; 441 Pa. at
197-99, 272 A.2d at 494-95.
31See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943); cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530-32 (1945). The Jamison Court,
for example, on facts similar to Valentine, upheld the right of a Jehovah's Witness to distribute a leaflet which espoused religious beliefs on one side and sought a donation on
the other. 318 U.S. at 414-16. This uncertainty led commentators to seek a standard by
which such decisions could be distinguished and explained. The subsequent explanations proferred may be summarized as follows:
(1) The Court originally relied on a "primary purpose" test to determine if the
speech in question was to be afforded first amendment protection-was the advertiser's
motive primarily economic gain or was there present a worthier intent? See Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 55; Redish, supra note 21, at 451; Developments in the
Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1028 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Developments in the Law]; The First Aimendinent t a Discount, supra note 25, at 66;
Recent Development, Prohibition of Abortion Referral Service Advertising Held
Unconstitutional, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 640, 642 n.8 (1976); An End in Sight to
Chrestensen?, supra note 25, at 1262.
(2) This "primary purpose" test was superseded by a "public interest" test based
upon content-did the advertisement contain enough information of value to the general
public to raise it from the confines of purely commercial speech? See Pittsburgh Press
Co. V. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-87 (1973); The First
Amendment (ita Discount, supra at 84; Recent Development, supra at 646-48; An End
in Sight to Chrestensen?, supra at 1267-68.
32 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821-22, 826-28 (1975); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386, 389 (1973);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66, 271 (1964). For discussion of the
Coirt's implementation of a balancing approach where first amendment issues are involved, see Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1028; Recent Development,
supra note 31, at 650-53; An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, supra note 25, at 1272-75;
44 U. CIN. L. REV. 852, 856-58 (1975).
a3Several cases brought before the Supreme Court required adjudication of the
right of'Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute leaflets which were characterized by the state
as commercial, but which the plaintiffs claimed were religiously oriented. See, e.g.,
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). The asserted state interests in these cases
ranged from preserving order in the public streets, see Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. at
415, to protecting citizens from unwanted intrusions or criminal schemes, see Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. at 144-45. In ruling in favor of the Witnesses in each case,
the Court found the handbills to be religious in nature rather than commercial, and then
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deem ed to be of public interest or importance and the state could not
sustain its burden of justifying the regulation, the speech would be
4
accorded constitutional protection. 3
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 35 for example, the Court
extended first amendment protection to statements which "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, [and] protested claimed abuses," despite the fact that these expressions appeared in a newspaper advertisement. 36 The advertisement, an attack
on policies of the Montgomery, Alabama police department, was
placed by a civil rights group. 3 7 Police commissioner Sullivan alleged
that references made in the advertisement constituted a direct, personal attack on his character and argued, in part, that the advertisement was not entitled to first amendment protection because of its
commercial character. 38 The Court dispensed with this contention by
holding that speech would not be stripped of its constitutional protection merely because of its appearance in a commercial context. 39 In
addition, the Court found that the right of The New York Times to
print an advertisement concerning an issue of vital importance to contemporary society outweighed the state's power to redress libelous
40
statements made against public officials.
The Court, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
concluded that plaintiff's' first amendment rights outweighed those asserted by the state.
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. at 142, 149; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. at
110-11, 114-15, 117; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. at 414, 417.
34
See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822, 826 (1975), discussed at notes
46-51 infra and accompanying text; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385--86, 389 (1973), discussed at notes 41-45 infra and accompanying text.
35 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31 Id. at 266. For discussion of the effect of the New York Times ruling on the commercial speech doctrine, see The First Amendment at a Discount, supra note 25, at
84; Recent Development, supra note 31, at 643; An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, supra
note 25, at 1267-68; 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 852, 854-55 (1975).
3' 376 U.S. at 256-57.
38 Id. at 265. Sullivan's contention that the statements could not be constitutionally
protected because of their appearance in a newspaper advertisement was based upon
the Valentine holding excluding commercial advertising from protection. Id.
39 Id. at 266.
40 See id. at 270-71, 277-78, 283. The primary issue in New York Times concerned
the validity of a judgment rendered against the newspaper under Alabama libel laws.
Id. at 267-68. The advertisement was sponsored by a civil rights group and embodied a
protest against racial discrimination. See id. at 257-58, 260; these facts were given great
weight by the Court in its final determination to hold the first amendment rights advanced by the Times paramount to the regulatory interests asserted by the state. See id.
at 264, 269-72.
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Human Relations,4 1 once again invoked a content test to determine
whether an advertisement came within the commercial speech exception. Pittsburgh Press contended that a city ordinance which precluded it from publishing employment opportunities under sexdesignated columns violated its rights of free speech and press. 42 The
Court, after examining the substance of the advertisements, characterized them as being more akin to "the [Valentine] than the Sullivan
advertisement" because they did "no more than . . . propos[e] . . .

possible employment." 43 As a result, they were "classic examples of
44
commercial speech" and not entitled to first amendment protection.

The Court further found that the governmental interest in preventing
illegal discriminatory practices was greater than "[a]ny First Amendment interest . . .served by advertising an ordinary commercial pro45

posal. "

Bigelow v. Virginia"6 marked another step in the Court's attempt

to define the limits of the commercial speech doctrine through a content analysis and balancing approach. Bigelow, managing editor of a
Virginia newspaper, advertised the availability of abortion services in
New York in violation of a Virginia statute prohibiting such advertising. 4 7 In the Court's view, the Bigelow advertisement "did
41 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
42 Id. at 377-78. The ordinance
permitted employment advertising under sexdesignated columns only for certain specified types of jobs. See id.
43 Id. at 385.
44Id. at 385, 391. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Douglas strongly
dissented in Pittsburgh Press. Id. at 393, 397, 400. These Justices indicated a reluctance
to expand the Valentine exception in general and especially in cases where the facts
were so significantly different. Id. at 393 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id.at 398 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); id. at 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Pittsburgh Press has also been the subject of commentary because of its seeming
support of the original Valentine commercial speech exception. See, e.g., The First
Amendment at a Discount, supra note 25, at 85-89; An End in Sight to Chrestensen?,
supra note 25, at 1258-61, 1268-69, 1275; 48 TUL. L. REV. 426, 428 (1974).
45 413 U.S. at 389. The Pittsburgh Press Co. had contended that the first amendment
exclusion for commercial speech should be abandoned. Id. at 388. The Court implied
that such a change in direction might be warranted in the future, but indicated that the
facts of the present case were not conducive to such a reversal since the advertisements
in question represented "illegal commercial activity." Id. (emphasis in original). As a
result, when the Court proceeded to balance the interests advocated by Pittsburgh Press
against those of the state, the illegality of the advertising practice weighted the scales
against Pittsburgh Press. See id. at 389.
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
47Id. at 811-12. The Court indicated that each state had the power to protect the
health and welfare of its citizens, but concluded that Virginia could "not, under the
guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that State." Id. at 824-25. The
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more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual "material of clear 'public interest.' -48 As such, it could be distinguished by its content from the advertisements in Valentine and
Pittsburgh Press and accorded first amendment protection. 49 Before
concluding that the Bigelow advertisement was constitutionally protected, the Court examined the reasons advanced by the state to justify its regulation of abortion advertising. 50 The Court found that
rather than constituting a valid exercise of safeguarding the public
health, the statute primarily succeeded in keeping Virginia citizens
ignorant of medical services available in other states. When balanced
against Bigelow's rights of free speech and press, the state's assertions
were found to be insufficient.51
In Bigelow, as in Pittsburgh Press, the commercial speech exception had been attacked by litigants who were disseminators of the
information. 5 2 In Virginia Citizens, however, the challenge had been
brought by consumers-the recipients of the information. 5 3 This distinction led the Court to address the issue of whether the consumers
had standing to bring the suit. 5 4 Relying on the broad principle,
firmly established through prior case law, that the right of free
speech extends to both speaker and receiver, the Court found that
Virginia legislature thereftore exceeded the bounds of legitimate exercise of state police
power. See id. at 822-25.
41 Id.
at 822. The "material of clear 'public interest' " in the Bigelotw advertisement
concerned abortion services. Id. A woman's interest in having an abortion had recently
been granted constitutional protection in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This factor led the Court to conclude that Bigelow's "First
Amendment interests coincided with the constitutional interests of the general public,"
thus making Bigelow's position the stronger one in the balance-of-interests analysis invoked by the Court. 421 U.S. at 822, 826-28 (footnote omitted).
49 421 U.S. at 821-22. Bigelow has been noted as a significant attempt by the Court
to restrict the impact of the Valentine holding. See, e.g., Recent Development, supra
note 31, at 648; 54 N.C.L. REV, 468, 469 (1976); 44 U. CiN. L. REV. 852, 856 (1975).
50 421 U.S. at 826-28. The state contended that regulation of abortion advertising
was warranted because the public health might be affected. Id. at 827. The state expressed the fear that, as a result of advertising, women desiring an abortion would go to
those mainly interested in reaping a profit rather than in rendering a quality medical
service. Id.
51
Id. at 826-29. implicit in the utilization of a balancing approach is the Court's
willingness to account for the unique circumstances present in each case. In Bigelow,
the fact that the advertisement incidentally affected the constitutional right to an abortion was duly considered. Id. at 822. In both Pittsburgh Press and in Valentine, extenuating circumstances worked against the first amendment interests involved. See 413
U.S. at 389 (sex discrimination being an illegal activity); 316 U.S. at 55 (an attempt to
circumvent the law).
52 See 421 U.S. at 811; 413 U.S. at 376.
53 96 S. Ct. at 1821.
54
See id. at 1822-23.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 67

the consumers had standing to assert a right to receive such
information. 55 The privilege of asserting this right was not negated by
the fact that the public had access to the information by means other
than publication., 6 The majority therefore concluded that if the advertisers had a constitutional right to publish, then the consumers
had "a reciprocal right to receive the advertising."5 "
Justice Rehnquist questioned the Court's extension of standing to
the consumers based on such a first amendment " 'right to
receive.' "8 He pointed out that the advertising ban did not foreclose
members of the public from having access to drug prices through
personal or telephonic inquiry at any pharmacy.59 The dissenting Jus55Id. at 1823. Statements by the Court acknowledging the existence of a right to
receive have been numerous. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974)
(arbitrary censorship of prisoners' outgoing mail deprived addressees of their right to
receive); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756, 760 (1972) (American citizens have
right to hear ideas and views of foreign Marxist journalist); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (general public has a right of access to different ideas);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (right of public to receive religious literature
is vital to "the preservation of a free society"); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
143 (1943) (right of persons to receive literature found as important as the right to distribute it).
5696 S. Ct. at 1823 n.15. The Court noted that the availability, through various channels, of information desired by the public did not preclude the assertion of a right to receive. Id. Furthermore, alternative means of access to information did not warrant abridgment of freedom of speech. Id. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
For a more general discussion of the public's right to know in the political sphere, see
Comment, The First Amendment and the Public Right to Information, 35 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 93 (1973).
5796 S. Ct. at 1823. Contrary to the argument advanced by the council that the right
to receive is not derived from the right to free speech but rather is independent of the
pharmacist's right to publish, see Brief of Appellees at 19, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), the Court concluded that the right to receive drug-price information arises only if the right to disseminate such data were established. See 96 S.Ct. at 1823.
5896 S. Ct. at 1835-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59Id. Justice Rehnquist distinguished the right to receive advocated by the consumers from that which had been established by the Court in previous decisions on
grounds of the accessibility of the desired information. Id. Virginia Citizens was viewed
as being a situation in which the concerned purchaser could either telephone or visit his
pharmacy to procure price information and one in which consumers, as a group, could
collect and publish the information. Id. at 1836. This situation was found in sharp contrast to both that of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (litigants asserting their
right to hear the ideas and beliefs of a Belgian Marxist which would have necessitated a
trip abroad), and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (recipients of information
would have had to travel to a state prison). 96 S. Ct. at 1836 n.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority's countervailing argument was that alternative means of access,
whether easily available, as by walking to the corner drugstore, or necessitating more
vigorous efforts, as by traveling abroad, should make no difference in consideration of
whether there existed a right to receive. See id. at 1823 n.15 (majority opinion).
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tice further emphasized the fact that the statutory prohibition was
only directed at pharmacists, thus not precluding the publication of
prices by other groups such as interested consumers. 60 Based on the
fact that no individual pharmacist had intervened in the suit, and that
the information desired by the consumers was in fact freely available
except through publication, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
consumers were "not asserting their 'right to receive information' .. .
but rather the right of some third party to publish." 6 1 For the Court
to extend standing on this basis was, in Justice Rehnquist's view,
"troublesome."62
In deciding whether the advertisement of prescription drug
prices should be accorded first amendment protection, the Virginia
Citizens Court utilized the same approach taken in the Pittsburgh
Press and Bigelow cases. 63 Its determination was based on a study of
the content of the speech, followed by a balancing of the interests
involved. 6 4 The Court found that a judgment on the basis of content
was necessitated by traditional first amendment theory, which considered the amendment "primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy. "65 Now, squarely confronted with
6,1
96 S. Ct. at 1836. Justice Rehnquist emphasized not only the fact that the statute
affected only pharmacists, but also that no pharmacist was party to the litigation. Id. In
his view, this made the consumers' standing even more tenuous. Id. However, when
the statute had heen attacked in a suit brought by pharmacists on fourteenth amendment grounds, it had been held constitutional. Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F.
Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969). Prior to Virginia Citizens, the only other case which had
succeeded in overturning a drug-price advertising ban on first amendment grounds had
been initiated by consumers. See Terry, v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
61 96 S. Ct. at 1836.
62
Id. at 1835. Justice Rehnquist implied that the consumers were granted standing
so that the end result of extending first amendment protection to commercial speech
could be achieved. See id. Whether the Court would have reached the same conclusion
had suit been brought by pharmacists, of course, can only be sunnised.
63 Compare id. at 1825-30 (majority opinion) with 421 U.S. at 821-28 and 413 U.S.
at 385-89.
64 96 S. Ct. at 1825-30.
65 Id. at 1827 (footnote omitted). The Court had consistently adhered to the Meikle-

john concept, discussed at notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text, of the purpose of
the first amendment. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (speech
having no redeeming social value found not worthy of constitutional protection); Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-74 (1942) (speech inciting riotous behavior
[" 'fighting' words"] is an exception to first amendment protection).
Justice Douglas appears to have been one of the first members of the bench to
indicate a willingness to abandon the Meiklejohn interpretation which did not include
first amendment coverage for commercial speech. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Conim'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
commercial matter was entitled to first amendment protection); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
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the issue of "whether speech which [did] 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction' " should be afforded constitutional protection, 66 the Court held that such speech did in fact serve the ac67
cepted purposes of the first amendment.
The majority reached this conclusion by analyzing the interests
of the parties who might gain from a commercial transaction induced
by an advertisement. 6 8 Beyond the interests of the advertiser6 9 and
the consumer, 70 the Court noted a substantial societal interest in the
uninhibited dissemination of commercial information. 71 It found that
advertising played an essential role in a free enterprise system,
regardless of whether or not individual advertisements could be
v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905, denying cert. to 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (information needed for private decisionmaking
considered as deserving of first amendment protection as "political expression").
66 96 S. Ct. at 1826 (quoting from Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. at 385).
67 96 S. Ct. at 1827, 1830.
68 Id. at 1826-27. In Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Snpp. 94
(N.D. Cal. 1975), the district court also focused upon the interests of the involved
parties-the same approach that was taken later- in Virginia Citizens. The plaintiff in
Terry sought to have declared unconstitutional a California statutory ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices. Id. at 96. The court, in invalidating the statute on first
amendment grounds, analyzed the interests of consumers and the general public and
found them to be substantial. Id. at 103-04. For further discussion of Terry and its
impact, see 6 Cuxl. L. REV. 711 (1976).
69 The Court noted that the advertiser's concern was "purely economic," 96 S. Ct. at
1826, but found that this fact should not negate one's qualification for constitutional
protection. Id. Pointing to examples in the labor field, the Court found that economic
interests in the outcome of labor (isputes did not disqualify statements made in such
situations from first amendment protection. Id.
70 The consumer's interest in the publication of prescription drug prices was considered vital. Id. For the poor, the sick and the elderly, learning the cost of drugs was not
a mere convenience, rather "[iut could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities." Id. at 1827. Many factors account for these groups being the
most adversely affected by an advertising ban; the elderly are often on a fixed income,
are often physically unable to engage in comparison shopping, and are more often afflicted by disease than other age groups, thus requiring more medication. Consideration
of such factors had led other courts to invalidate drug-price advertising bans. See, e.g.,
Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94, 103-04, 109 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 105-06, 311 A.2d 242, 244
(1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 197-99, 272 A.2d 487,
494-95 (1971).
In addition to drug-price advertising bans, the differences between the drug market
and markets for other types of products-such differences as the lack of choice regarding the amount and the type of drug to be purchased-may also adversely affect consumers in their purchase of drugs. See Note, Retail Drug Advertising Bans are Bad
Medicine for Consuners-Is There a Sherman Act Prescription?,15 ARIz. L. REV. 117,
122-26 (1973).
71 96 S. Ct. at 1827.

1976]

NOTES

deemed of public importance or interest. 72 Access to commercial information, whether it be of public value or not, leads to numerous,
daily decisions concerning the allocation of economic resources, and
eventually the success or failure of business enterprises. 73 Moreover,
commercial information is also needed to formulate opinions as to
74
how the free enterprise system might "be regulated or altered."
This line of reasoning led the Court to conclude that information
needed to make economic decisions is as deserving of first amend75
ment protection as information with political or social content.
The interests of the advertiser, consumer and general public
were weighed against the justifications advanced by the state in support of the statutory prohibition of drug-price advertising. 76 The arguments relied upon by the board of pharmacy concerned the effects
that a lifting of the ban would have on pharmacists, consumers and
society at large. The board argued that inferior service to the public
would result from unrestricted advertising by pharmacists. 7 7 Consumers would begin to frequent pharmacies offering a lower price,
thus causing a loss in established customer relationships. 78 These ill

72 Id. The Court tbund that advertisements, aside from promoting products, could
also relate information of general interest, Id. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 812,
822 (informing public of availability of abortion services); see also Fur Information &
Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(advertising artificial furs as an alternative to real firs which necessitate the killing of
endangered species).
However, the Court's refusal to rely upon a distinction between informational and
other types of advertising in its determination of whether to accord constitutional protection to advertising seems wise; according to one author, even "[a] cursory examination of current . . . advertising reveals that . . . comparatively little commercial promotion performs . . . a purely informational function." Redish, supra note 21, at 433.
However, Redish, like the Court, see 96 S. Ct. at 1827, concluded that even if advertising contained little informational value, it should still be entitled to first amendment
protection. Redish, supra at 433.
73 96 S. Ct. at 1827. The conclusion reached by the Court, that the aggregate decisions of the public have far-reaching effects on our economic system, had been relied
upon by several writers as a basis for proposing that first amendment protection be
extended to commercial speech. See, e.g., Goss, supra note 23, at 625-32; Redish, supra
note 21, at 472; Comment, The First Amendmnent and Consumner Protection: Coininercial Advertising as Protected Speech, 50 ORE. L. REV. 177, 184-89 (1971).
7496 S. Ct. at 1827.
75Id. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
76 96 S. Ct. at 1828-30.
77Id. at 1828. The board contended that the pharmacist's services, when properly
performed, require time and effort. Id. Competition Would force the conscientious
pharmacist to forego rendering all but basic services in order to remain in the market,
with resulting adverse effects on the consumer. Id.
78Id. at 1828-29 & n.22. The board claimed that a loss in stable, long-standing
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effects would be compounded by a denigrated image of the professional pharmacist. 79 While acknowledging the significant state interest
in maintaining high professional standards, the Court rejected the
board's primary contention that such standards would be jeopardized
by allowing price advertising. 8 0 Although these justifications had been
considered adequate by the Court to sustain advertising bans on fourteenth amendment grounds, the first amendment approach relied on
by the consumers here mandated that the state now vindicate the
suppression of price information by a different rationale. 8"
The state's assertion that the best interests of the public were
served by the advertising ban could not be justified because, in the
majority's view, its foundation rested upon a public "kept in ignorance."8' 2 Potential misuse of drug-price information by the buying
relationships between consumers and pharmacists would make "monitoring . . . impossible." Id. at 1828-29. Monitoring is the practice, engaged in by very few pharmacists,
of keeping health records on each individual customer. Id. at 1828. Such records would
indicate to a pharmacist, for example, the person's allergies to any drugs, and would list
all medications taken by the individual. Id. This practice can only be effectively engaged in if an individual consumer purchases all his prescriptions at the same pharmacy. See id. at 1828-29. However, the Court pointed to several factors that had already
contributed to making the practice obsolete, such as the mobility of the public and the
availability of drugs without prescription. Id. at 1828 n.22. For a discussion of monitoring and other justifications advanced by the pharmaceutical profession in its attempt to
uphold advertising bans, see 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 617, 618-21, 624-26 (1971); 28
OKLA. L. REV. 350, 352-55 (1975).
7996 S. Ct. at 1829. The board argued that the public image of the pharmacist as a
highly skilled professional would be tarnished if he engaged in competitive advertising
similar to that of the ordinary tradesman. Id. However, the belief that advertising is a
negative reflection on professionalism has been questioned. See Alberti, Why Don't the
Professions Advertise?, 59 CASE & COM. 3, 5-6 (1954) (advertising should no longer be
considered beneath the dignity of professional groups); Freedman, Advertising and So-

licitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 184-87 (1976) (dignified advertising by lawyers
should be allowed).
8o 96 S. Ct. at 1829-30. The Court concluded that professional standards would be
insured by the close supervision and regulatory practices of the board rather than by
the advertising ban which in fact had no effect on those standards whatsoever. Id. The
maintenance of professional standards through advertising bans had been considered
too remote a justification for upholding such bans in other cases as well. See, e.g., Terry
v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94, 105-46 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Maryland
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 112-16, 311 A.2d 242, 247-48 (1973).
"1 96 S. Ct. at 1829. The Court had upheld professional advertising bans on grounds
that such advertising did affect professional standards. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of
Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 426, 429 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608,
612 (1935).
82 96 S. Ct. at 1829. The Court found that although the state could enact
legislation
protecting the public welfare, such measures could not be predicated upon the suppres-
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public not only was an insufficient justification for the statute but also
exhibited a "highly paternalistic approach."' 3 In the Court's opinion,
neither the legislature nor the judiciary may make the "choice .. . between the dangers of suppressing information . . . and the dangers of
its misuse if it [were] freely available" because such a determination 8is4
dictated by the constitutional guarantees of the first amendment.
The Court concluded that the suppression of price information could
not withstand the mandate of the first amendment that the public pos85
sesses a right to know.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, clearly disagreed with the
majority's liberalized interpretation of the first amendment, extending
protection to commercial speech.8 6 Adhering to a more conservative,
traditional approach, the Justice contended that the first amendment
should protect "public decisionmaking as to political, social, and other
public issues, rather than the decision . . . as to whether to purchase
one or another kind of shampoo."-87 In his view, the majority's apsion of information which consumers could use effectively to protect themselves. See id.
at 1829-30.
83 Id. at 1829.
84

Id.

85 See id. at 1829-31. In Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94,
98 (N.D. Cal. 1975), plaintiff's reliance upon a right-to-know approach proved successful
in invalidating a state ban on prescription drug-price advertising. Several writers, commenting on the utilization of such an approach in Terry and Virginia Citizens, indicated
that assertion of the right to know in this area would prove successful to litigants seeking
to overturn drug-price advertising bans. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 12, at 776-77; 6
CUM. L. REV. 711, 719-21 (1976); 23 KAN. L. REV. 289, 289-90, 294-300 (1975). However, one author has concluded that "courts should not use an incidental infringement
on first amendment interests as an excuse to remedy an inadequate distribution of needed
drugs to disadvantaged individuals." Note, supra note 12, at 108-13, 128.
86 96 S. Ct. at 1835 (dissenting opinion).
87 Id. at 1838. Justice Rehnquist's dissent indicates an unwillingness to abandon the
Meiklejohn interpretation of the first amendment which had prevailed in former adjudications by the Court. See id. For a discussion and critique of the Meiklejohn interpretation, see notes 21-23 & 65 supra and accompanying text. Other writers have also
viewed the first amendment as the protector of ideas necessary to political and social
decisionmaking, the purpose of which did not extend into economic pursuits. See, e.g.,
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15 (1966);
Resnik, Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 655,
658-59 (1942).
One commentator, writing subsequent to Virginia Citizens, has indicated his support of the position taken by Justice Rehnquist. See Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976). In an extensive discussion,
Professor Baker has argued that advertising is not worthy of constitutional protection
since it "lacks the crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization which
exist for speech generally." Id. at 3. Professor Baker further contends that the Court's
focus, in making constitutional determinations concerning speech, should be on the
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proach elevated commercial speech to a level "previously reserved for
the free marketplace of ideas."'8 8 Such a finding was unwarranted,
Justice Rehnquist argued, because the determination regarding the
validity of drug-price advertising was one that should lie with the
state legislature. 8 9 For Justice Rehnquist, the Virginia legislature had
acted well within the acknowledged police powers of the state to regulate professions and protect the health and welfare of the public.9 0
He contended that the state's powers in these areas should not be
overridden by the Court's desire to foster a public policy which allowed for the dissemination of economic information. 9 1
Although the majority extended first amendment protection into
the commercial area, they did indicate that commercial speech was
distinguishable from other kinds of speech and, therefore, subject to
regulation by the state. 92 Commercial speech differed from other
forms of speech in several significant respects. First, its content could
be verified by advertisers acquainted with the true attributes of their
products. Secondly, since the primary purpose of advertising is to
produce profits, there is little possibility that the presence of governmental regulation in the area would dissuade commercial speakers
speaker rather than on the content of the speech and that the balancing approach adopted
by the Court should be replaced by an absolutist theory. Id. at 3-4.
88 96 S. Ct. at 1835. Justice Rehnquist cited the dissenting opinion of Justice Black
in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 649 (1951), in support of his contention that the
first amendment was inapplicable to commercial activity. 96 S. Ct. at 1838. Yet, it
should be noted that Justice Black was dissenting from a majority opinion which had
denied the claim of a magazine salesman that the first amendment was violated by a
city ordinance which prohibited door-to-door solicitation. 341 U.S. at 642-45, 649-50.
Justice Black thought that such restrictions were violative of the right "to publish and
circulate." Id. at 649-50 (Black, J., dissenting).
89 96 S. Ct. at 1836-37. The Justice felt that it was the role of the legislature to
balance the factors necessary in making a determination as to whether or not drug
prices should be advertised. Id. at 1836-38. Furthermore, he found controlling and indistinguishable the case of Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1955),
where the Court acknowledged the right of the legislature to prohibit eyeglass advertising. 96 S. Ct. at 1837.
90 See 96 S. Ct. at 1836. The Court had previously upheld the power of state legislatures to prohibit professional advertising pursuant to their authority to protect the public
health. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424,
428-29 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 490 (1955);
Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610-13 (1935). But see
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963), where a Virginia statute regulating solicitation of business by the legal profession was held violative of the NAACP legal
department's constitutional rights.
91 See 96 S. Ct. at 1836; Note, supra note 12, at 125-28 (adopting the same viewpoint as that of Justice Rehnquist).
92 96 S. Ct. at 1830 & n.24.
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from engaging in advertising. 93 As a result, the Court concluded that
regulation to insure the truthfulness and legality of commercial
94
speech was warranted and constitutionally acceptable.
Justice Stewart concurred in the majority's decision that constitutional protection of commercial speech did not preclude its regulation
by the state.9 5 He noted that constitutional protection and regulation
were not mutually exclusive and in fact co-existed in certain areas of
the law such as libel and labor relations, where first amendment protection is not regarded as absolute. 96 Relying on libel cases for illustration, Justice Stewart indicated that where harm or injury could
result from false statements, certain limitations on speech were
necessary. 9 7 If such restrictions were applicable in the area of libelous
communication, then, by implication, they were warranted in the
area of commercial speech where injury to the public could be even
greater. 98
The concurring Justice arrived at this conclusion by examining
the unique factors present in the realm of advertising. Since advertisers could easily ascertain the truth about their products, there need
be no fear that government regulation would chill the dissemination
of accurate commercial communication. 99 Furthermore, if false and
93 id. at 1830 n.24. Although the Court granted first amendment protection to commercial speech, it stipulated that the degree of protection fbr such speech would not be
commensurate with that given other forms of speech. Id. The differences between commercial speech and other types of speech would also allow for a lower degree of tolerance by the state regarding inaccurate or deceptive statements, since there need be no
appreciable "fear of silencing the speaker." Id. Furthermore, the state could make certain demands on commercial speakers to insure that advertisements were not deceptive.
Id.
9 Id. at 1830-31 & n.24.
95 Id. at 1832-33.
96 Id. at 1833-34. Justice Stewart cited several cases where first amendment rights,
although recognized, did not preclude limitation on the speech in question. Id. For
example, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-20 (1969), an employer's
first amendment right to communicate his views concerning unionism did not preclude
the Court from characterizing his statements as unfair and coercive and, therefore, not
entitled to protection. Accord, NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477
(1941).
97 96 S. Ct. at 1833. Professor Emerson has justified governmental incursion in the
area of libel regulation by reasoning that
[t]he restriction on expression is imposed within narrow bounds, in a situation
where the government can effectively perform the role of umpire. . . . Under
all the circumstances it is unlikely . . . that the limitation results in any serious
impairment of the right to freedom of expression.
T. EMERSON, su pro note 87, at 68-71.
98 96 S. Ct. at 1833.
9
"Id. In a case such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, it would have been very
difficult for the newspaper to properly ascertain the truth of the allegedly libelous ad-
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deceptive advertising could be eliminated through state control, the
real interests of first amendment protection would be served-making
available to the public information needed for intelligent economic
decisionmaking.1 00 Justice Stewart concluded that since injury to the
public by false advertising could be serious, and truthful information
was easily determinable by the advertiser, commercial speech could
properly be accorded the dual status of being constitutionally protected yet subject to governmental regulation. 0 '
The lifting of the Virginia ban on the publication of prescription
drug prices based on the first amendment right of the consumer to
have access to information raises serious questions concerning the future of other types of professional advertising. The majority found
that the differences between the profession of pharmacy and other
professional groups would preclude the Virginia Citizens holding from
being applicable in other cases.' 0 2 The Court mentioned that certain
features distinguished pharmacy from other professions, yet elaborated on this statement only by way of a single illustration. 103 Since
other professions, such as law and medicine, ordinarily are not involved in dispensing products, but rather are engaged in rendering a
myriad of services, advertising by these groups could prove inadvertently deceptive.' 0 4 This is due to the fact that it is patently more
difficult to accurately value intangible services than it is to determine
the cost of actual commodities.
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the opinion that the holding of
vertisement it published, see 376 U.S. at 279, to have upheld the state court judgment
against The New York Times, Co., therefore, would have represented a serious infringement of free speech, perhaps resulting in a chilling effect in this area. Id.; see 96 S. Ct. at
1833. The Times situation was therefore distinguishable from the realm of commercial
speech where advertisers could easily ascertain the truth of their statements prior to publication. Id.
100 96 S. Ct. at 1835. Justice Stewart, in reaching the conclusion that commercial
speech was deserving of first amendment protection because of its role in economic
decisionmaking, indicated acceptance of a liberalized reading of the amendment advocated by several commentators, see note 23 supra, and other members of the bench, see
note 65 supra. 96 S. Ct. at 1835.
101 96 S. Ct. at 1833-35.
102 Id.
at 1831 n.25. The majority failed to devote any significant discussion to the
effect, if any, of the Virginia Citizens decision on other professions. Reserving consideration of such questions for a later date, the Court emphasized the fact that Virginia
Citizens only concerned the advertising of prescription drug prices by pharmacists. Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. Other writers have also pointed to the distinction between the selling of
goods, which is the pharmacist's major concern, and the rendering of services, which is
typical of other professional groups, as a factor limiting any analogy between pharmacists and other professionals. See Note, supra note 70, at 135-37; 23 KA 7. L. REV. 289,
299 (1975).
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Virginia Citizens could be limited to the profession of pharmacy and
the advertising of prescription drug prices. 10 5 In his view the
pharmacist's main concern in this instance was the dispensation of a
pre-packaged drug. 10 6 This act more closely resembled a clerical
function rather than a professional one since all the pharmacist was
required to do was transfer the correct number of tablets from the
manufactured package to the prescription bottle.107 The Chief Justice
stipulated that other factors would have to be considered if the Court
were to validate an advertising ban which affected "the traditional
learned professions of medicine or law."' 1 8 In these occupations professional judgment is required, making the rendering of these services
more difficult to price than a commodity. 10 9 It becomes apparent in
the opinions of both the majority and the Chief Justice that the legitimacy of professional advertising bans rests on the distinction between the rendering of services and the sale of products.
Justice Rehnquist believed the Court's holding could not be so
narrowly interpreted as to have no effect on advertising by other professional groups.110 He noted that other professionals offered services
for which standardized prices were charged, making the distinction
between the sale of goods and the rendering of services a highly artificial one."' Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist indicated that if the
state were now constitutionally restricted to prohibiting only that advertising which is false or misleading, then no valid distinction could
be drawn between advertising by pharmacists and by other professional groups. 112 As long as the advertising meets the standard of
105 96 S. Ct. at 1831-32.

1061d. at 1831. The Chief Justice stipulated that since approximately 95% of all
prescriptions were already prepared in dispensable form, the pharmacist need only
transfer the proper dosage into the prescription bottle and include the physician's instructions. I d.
f07ld.
losId. The Chief Justice noted that the state would have a more significant interest
in the regulation of the legal and medical professions. Id. at 1831-32, Lawyers, for example, not only served clients, but were required to aid in the administration of justice.
Id.
109 Id. One writer has suggested that pharmacists, since they are engaged in supplying both a product and a service, could indicate separately on the customer hill the fee
charged for the service and the price charged for the drug. See 49 CALIF. L. REv. 340,
347 (1961).
110 96 S.Ct. at 1836 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"I See id, at 1837. Justice Rehnquist stated that he could not "distinguish between
the public's right to know the price of drugs and its right to know the price of title
searches or physical examinations or other professional services for which standardized
fees are charged." Id.
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truthfulness, the first amendment now prevents the state from proscribing it. 1 3 The majority's holding, therefore, could not be limited to the facts of Virginia Citizens but, on the contrary, it could
be extended to other kinds of advertising and various other
professions. 114
Whether the Virginia Citizens holding can be limited to the profession of pharmacy remains questionable in light of the Court's acknowledgment of a consumer right to know. 1 15 If first amendment
protection is considered necessary to a general societal goal of informed economic decisionmaking, 116 then publication of professional,
as well as non-professional, prices would seem warranted. Addition-

112

Id.

Implicit in Justice Rehnquist's view is the presumption that if the only stan-

dard for first amendment protection of commercial speech is the truthfulness of that
speech, then practically all groups would be able to comply and state prohibitions on
professional advertising wvould thus be precluded. See id. at 1836-39 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
I3 Various writers have recognized that in the area of advertising, and especially in
the realm of pharmaceutical advertising, complete truth and accuracy are the most important prerequisites. Only by demanding such requirements Could the state effectively
protect the health, safety and welfare of the public. See, e.g., Zito, Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 350 (1971); Comment, Advertising of
Food and Drugs: Concealing a Truth, Hinting a Lie, 8 AKRON L. REV. 456, 478-80
(1975).
114 96 S. Ct. at 1837. The Justice concluded that if the only delineation between
what was constitutionally protected and what could be governmentally prohibited centered on ihe truthfulness of the communication, then decisions in areas where commercial speech had been curtailed on the basis of other standards would have to be questioned. Id. at 1837-38. As an example, Justice Rehnquist pointed to court rulings in the
field of labor relations where statements made by employers had been struck down
when "found to be implicitly coercive." Id. at 1838.
115 On the basis of the public's right to know, one commentator has advocated a
lifting of advertising bans affecting lawyers. See Freedman, supra note 79, at 184-86.
Professor Freedman has expressed agreement with Justice (then American Bar Association President) Powell's observation, included in the commentary to the Code of Professional Responsibility, "that when people are denied their day in court because ignorance has prevented them from obtaining counsel, there is a denial of the fundamental
right to equal justice under law." Id. at 184. Since the public is unaware of the cost and
availability of legal services due to the presence of advertising prohibitions, the public's
constitutional rights are being violated and the profession's obligation to afford access to
the legal system is undercut. Id. at 186. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
419-20, 444 (1963), where it was held that the activities of the NAACP's legal department, making known the availability of legal representation in desegregation cases, did
not violate a statutory ban on solicitation by lawyers.
116 There have been indicators from other sources supporting the Court's premise
that publication of information utilized in economic decisionmaking is desirable. For
example, in The New York Times, it was reported that "the California Citizen Action
Group" conducted a survey regarding consumer knowledge "of the facts necessary to
make intelligent purchases of eyeglasses." Cerra, Buyer of Glasses Is Often Misled,
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ally, absolute advertising prohibitions seem incapable of withstanding
a first amendment attack based on the right to know, since the Court
has strongly supported both the individual consumer's and the
public's claim to such a right." 7 The questions remaining in the area
of professional advertising, therefore, will most likely concern the extent to which such advertising may be constitutionally regulated.
The Court has stated that first amendment protection for commercial speech does not preclude governmental regulation.11 8 Yet the
boundary between such protection and permissible regulation has to
be more clearly delineated. Where bans which are permissive as to
some forms of advertising are in question, a balancing approach will
afford the state an opportunity to justify such a ban. A resulting counterargument to an asserted right to know may be a state claim that
less restrictive advertising would prove deceptive or misleading. 119 In addition, the expressed hesitancy of the Court to analogize the Virginia Citizens holding to advertising by professionals other
than pharmacists, 120 as well as its reliance upon a goods-services
distinction in scrutinizing such bans, 12 1 may prove advantageous
to those litigants seeking to uphold advertising prohibitions.
Whether these factors will indeed prove significant may become
apparent in Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 12 2 a case now pending before
the Supreme Court, in which a prohibition against legal advertising
is being challenged.' 23 Bates and O'Steen, two Phoenix attorneys,
placed a newspaper advertisement listing certain legal services availN.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1976, at 30, col. 1. The survey concluded that the public was
"abysmally ignorant" in this area. Id.
117 96 S. Ct. 1826-27.
118Id. at 1830. For further discussion of the questions raised by Virginia Citizens
concerning the extent of first amendment protection to be accorded commercial speech
in the future, see The Supreie Court, 197.5 Teri, 90 -IARV. L. REx'. 142, 149-51 (1976).
119The Court has clearly stated that its decision should in no way hamper the state
in regulating advertising which may prove deceptive or misleading. 96 S. Ct. at 1830.
20
1
See id. at 1831 n.25.
121 Id. For discussion concerning the goods-services distinction and its effect on
professional advertising, see pp. 85-86 & notes 104, 106 & 109 supra.
122 45 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (No. 76-316), noting prob. juris. to In re
Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976) (en bane). The Arizona supreme court held
that the rule prohibiting legal advertising was neither violative of the first amendment
nor of the Sherman Act. 113 Ariz. at 397, 399, 555 P.2d at 642, 645. The court further
found the due process, equal protection and vagueness claims of the attorneys to be
without merit. Id. at 399-400, 555 P.2d at 645-46. On appeal to the Supreme Court,
only the questions concerning the rule's possible violation of the first amendment and
the Sherman Act are being considered. 45 U.S.L.W. at 3219-20.
12345 U.S.L.W. at 3219-20. See also Arguments Before The Court, 45 U.S.L.W.
3497, 3497-99 (Jan. 25, 1977).
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able through their office and the prices charged.12 4 This was done
in contravention of a state disciplinary rule forbidding such advertising. 12 5 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Bates and O'Steen have
asserted that the advertising ban is violative of the first amendment
and deprives consumers of information which would aid them in obtaining legal services. 1 26 The State Bar has argued that advertising
would only serve to undermine professional integrity and that the
problem of limited access to legal services by consumers can best
be solved by individual state action rather than through Supreme
27
Court mandate. 1
Although the Court indicated that its holding was a limited one,
Virginia Citizens effectively ended much of the uncertainty generated
since Valentine. The general principle that commercial speech is entitled to first amendment protection has been established.' 2 8 Notwithstanding the need for further clarification, this grant of protection for
information needed in economic decisionmaking marks a significant
step toward a more expansive interpretation of the first amendment. 129 Despite the Court's reluctance to acknowledge it as such, its
opinion may be deemed a departure from traditional constitutional
theory. 130 Furthermore, this decision lends valuable support toward
affirmation of a first amendment right to know and as a result, represents a move in the direction of greater protection of consumer
interests. Concomitant with the greater protection afforded the consumer, Virginia Citizens may well be considered a harbinger of the
demise of the professional advertising ban.
Ellen Sperber Clarkson

124 In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 395, 555 P.2d 640, 641 (1976) (en banc).

125ld.
126 Arguments Before The Court, supra note 123, at 3497-98.
127 Id. at 3498-99. See Supreme Court Will Hear Lawyers' Advertising Case from
Arizona, 62 A.B.A.J. 1422 (1976), for additional discussion of this case and analysis of
the Arizona supreme court decision.
128 96 S. Ct. at 1826.
129 The Virginia Citizens holding may be viewed either as within the mainstream of
established first amendment theory or as a significant departure from it. The Court concluded that its grant of constitutional protection to commercial speech served the established goals of the first amendment. Id. at 1837. But it may be argued that such a conclusion rests on too tenuous a base, and rather than attempting to bring its holding
within established bounds, the Court should acknowledge the adoption of a new orientation.
130 For a discussion of traditional first amendment theory, see notes 21-23 supra
and accompanying text.

